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In this paper, we investigate the coordination of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and n Bertrand competing
retailers under disruptions of market demand and production cost. We present a coordination model of a supply chain
under normal scenarios. Our findings demonstrate that the coordination scheme designed for the initial production plan
should be revised when disruptions of market demand and production cost occur. To resolve this issue, we consider the
possible deviation costs caused by disruptions and propose optimal decision models for different disruptions under
centralised decision-making. We present an improved revenue-sharing contract model to coordinate the decentralised
supply chain under disruptions. The proposed models are then further analysed through numerical examples.
Keywords: supply chain coordination; disruption management; decision support; revenue-sharing contract; game theory;
optimisation
1. Introduction
In recent years, supply chain coordination has emerged as an attractive area for firms to improve performance (Cachon
2003). Existing studies on supply chain coordination have mainly focused on decision-making under a normal marketing
environment, which assumes that the demand is deterministic and known, and the manufacturer has perfect information
about the market demands and so on. However, as economic integration and globalisation deepen, the unexpected
changes of market demands and production costs are more common than ever before (Lei, Li, and Liu 2012). After the
production or sales plans have been agreed, the marketing environment can often be disrupted by unexpected haphazard
events, which may result in changes in demand or the cost of the products that affect the original production or sales
plans. Therefore, such demand and cost disruptions may have significant impacts on business performance since supply
chains can hardly recover from these disruptions in a short period time if these disruptions are not managed properly. It
would benefit to the members of a supply chain if effective strategies to deal with such disruptions have been adopted
in order to attain supply chain performance.
Both academics and practitioners recognise the importance of an effective contract to deal with supply chain disrup-
tions (Yu and Qi 2004; Wu et al. 2010). A number of models have been proposed in order to study how to handle sup-
ply chain disruptions (Qi, Bard, and Yu 2004; Xu, Qi, and Yu 2006; Xiao and Qi 2008). Adjusting and handling
unexpected disruptions in an efficient and effective way are becoming more and more important to the success of supply
chain management. However, previous studies on supply chain coordination management mainly focus on static coordi-
nation mechanisms, with quantity discount under a deterministic environment, such as known market demands and pro-
duction costs (Cachon 2003). The situation of cost or demand disruptions in one supplier and one retailer supply chain
have been considered (Qi, Bard, and Yu 2004; Yu and Qi 2004; Xu, Qi, and Yu 2006; Lei, Li, and Liu 2012). However,
many manufacturers face multiple geographically dispersed and heterogeneous retailers (Yu and Qi 2004).
With considerations to more close to real world situations, this study investigates how disruptions would affect the
coordination scheme with revenue-sharing contracts and how to coordinate the supply chain after disruptions. In particu-
lar, the study examines the scenario where production costs and demands disruptions occur at the same time. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first time that a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate a supply chain with multiple retailers
under demand and cost simultaneous disruptions has been considered.
Production cost disruptions often refer to situations in which production costs change from their estimated values,
which are used to design the coordination scheme. Cost disruptions may occur when raw material prices and transportation
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costs change, or due to equipment failures or interest rate fluctuations (Xu, Qi, and Yu 2006). Cost disruptions can occur
in various forms at any stage of the production process with varying consequences. Thus, different solutions are needed
for each of those situations. Unexpected changes in market demands are very common in practice (Qi, Bard, and Yu
2004), for example, an earthquake might cause a large sudden demand for tents; the epidemic of mad cow disease affected
the demand for beef consumption to a large degree. Such costs or/and demand disruptions will impact on consumers,
retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers in an entire supply chain; thus, effective models and coordination mechanisms for
the supply chain are needed in order to handle such disruptions. To adopt optimised decisions to deal with disruptions
from a systems point of view will provide the decision-makers distinctive advantages.
In this paper, we focus on the scenario that simultaneous production cost and demand disruptions occur in a supply
chain, which includes a single manufacturer and n retailers who compete in a Bertrand market. Our particular interest is
supply chain coordination. It is assumed that the manufacturer first acts as a Stackelberg leader, who offers the retailers
a take-it-or-leave-it contract menu, including different revenue-sharing contracts, and the retailers then act as the follow-
ers who will choose both how many units of the product to order and its retail price. In a centralised supply chain, the
central decision-maker determines the retail price and the production quantity, aiming at supply chain profit maximisa-
tion under a disruption scenario. In the decentralised supply chain, the manufacturer and the retailers are independent
decision-makers who seek to maximise their individual profit.
We analyse the managerial insights on how production cost and demand disruptions affect a revenue-sharing contract
where there are competing retailers. We have some interesting observations: first, it is possible that the manufacturer’s
original production plan could tolerant a certain degree of disruptions and retain a certain degree of robustness; when
the cost and demand are changed within certain thresholds, it is acceptable for the supply chain to keep the original pro-
duction plan, and for adjustments in prices alone to compensate the deviation costs. Only when the change in the
demand and cost exceed certain thresholds, should both the original production quantities and the prices be adjusted.
Second, the disruptions may have a significant effect on the revenue-sharing contract, including the order quantities,
wholesale prices and revenue share, so the improved revenue-sharing contract could coordinate the decentralised supply
chain and produce greater profit than the scenario where the original plan is retained.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the related literature is reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces
the basic coordination model. Section 4 presents the coordination of a centralised supply chain with revenue-
sharing contracts. In Section 5, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with improved revenue-sharing contracts
is introduced. Numerical examples with analytical results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 summarises this paper.
2. Related work
This study is related to the intersection of supply chain coordination and disruption management, and two elements in
the arena of supply chain coordination management, namely the revenue-sharing contract, supply chain disruption
management. Hence, in the following, recent studies on these topics are reviewed and analysed.
Designing coordination schemes have been an important issue in the study of supply chain management (Wu et al.
2010). A revenue-sharing contract is beneficial to manufacturers, retailers and other participants within a supply chain
(Cachon and Lariviere 2005). In deterministic demand aspects, Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) coordinated a three
stage supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract. Kebing, Chengxiu, and Yan (2007) studied coordination mechanisms
in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand
and developed a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate such a supply chain. In undeterministic demand aspects,
Pasternack (1985) indicated that the right revenue-sharing contract can coordinate two dyadic supply chains under
stochastic demand; Dana and Spier (2001) adopted revenue-sharing contracts to coordinate a supply chain in a basic
supplier–retailer channel setting. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) generalised Dana and Spier (2001) by studying the
revenue-sharing contract in a two-echelon distribution channel with competing retailers and found that in an extended
setting, where market demand is both retail price sensitive and stochastic, only a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate
the channel. Gerchak and Wang (2004) considered a revenue-sharing contract in assembly systems with random
demand. Wang, Jiang, and Shen (2004) studied the channel performance of supply chains under consignment contract
with revenue sharing and found that both the overall channel performance and the performance of individual firms
depend critically on demand price elasticity and on the retailer’s share of channel cost and indicate that a decentralised
supply chain cannot be perfectly coordinated. Li and Hua (2008) extended the work of Wang et al. and provided a
cooperative game model that implements profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer to achieve their
cooperation. Weng (2004) also considered the revenue-sharing contract in a one-period, supplier–buyer channel facing
uncertain and price-dependent market demand and found that the loss in channel profit increases with demand price
elasticity and decreases with the buyer’s share of cost. Zou, Pokharel, and Piplani (2004) developed an analytical model



































to synchronise different processing times through the strategic placement of safety stocks at each player’s premise and
found that a revenue-sharing contract can be used for channel coordination in a two-echelon decentralised assembly
system facing uncertain market demand. In multi-retailer aspects, Yao, Leung, and Lai (2008) investigated a revenue-
sharing contract for coordinating a supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers, they
assumed the demand from two competing retailers is independent and all parties know their demand distributions at the
beginning of the season, but they did not consider the situations of demand or cost disruptions. It was found that the
provision of revenue sharing in the contract can provide better performance than a price-only contract.
Chen, Zhang, and Sun (2012) studied a manufacturer’s pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain and found
that a manufacturer’s contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel
supply chain. Cachon (2003) summarised supply chain coordination mechanisms and offered a detailed review on the
strengths and limitations of different supply chain contracts.
Disruption management in the supply chain is another aspect closely related to our work. Supply chain disruption
management has attracted increasing attention (Yu and Qi 2004; Wu et al. 2010). One main difference between coordi-
nation under disruptions and coordination under a normal environment is that the sudden changes in demands and costs
will cause certain deviation costs that did not previously exist (Yu and Qi 2004). These deviation costs can be caused
by the over-time production and the expedited delivery for an increased demand, or the extra inventory holding and pos-
sible disposal for a decreased demand. The costs may be incurred by either the manufacturer or the retailers. To achieve
effective supply chain management, such deviation costs must be appropriately taken into account. The concept of dis-
ruption management was first introduced by Clausen, Hansen, and Larsen (2001) and applied successfully in airline
operations. Xiao and Yu (2006) studied the effects of supply chain disruptions on the evolution of retailers’ behaviour,
where retailers are bounded rationality and quantity competition with homogeneous goods. All the above work assumed
a centralised system without considering coordination schemes.
In demand disruption aspects, Qi, Bard, and Yu (2004) examined a scenario with one manufacturer and one retailer
under demand disruptions and proposed a quantity discount contract to coordinate a two-stage supply chain. Huang, Yu,
and Song (2006) studied an exponential demand disruption and adopted an all-quantity discount policy to coordinate a
supply chain. Chen and Xiao (2009) developed two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one
manufacturer, one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate a supply chain after
demand disruption. Zegordi and Davarzani (2012) used a Petrinets-based model as a tool to understand the dissemina-
tion of disruptions and to trace the operational performance of a supply chain. Chen and Zhuang (2011) considered a
coordination model of a one manufacturer and multi-retailer supply chain with a dominant retailer’s sales promotion
opportunity and possible demand disruption. Huang, Yang, and Zhang (2012) studied the pricing and production prob-
lem in a two-period dual-channel supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer with demand disruptions.
In the cost disruption aspect, Xu, Qi, and Yu (2006) studied the case of production cost being disrupted and pro-
posed a quantity discount contract to coordinate a supplier–retailer supply chain. Hou, Zeng, and Zhao (2010) proposed
a buy-back contract between a buyer and a backup supplier when the buyer’s main supplier experiences supply and
demand disruptions. Li, Wang, and Cheng (2010) investigated the sourcing strategy of a retailer and the pricing strate-
gies of two suppliers in a supply chain under an environment of supply disruption. Yu, Zeng, and Zhao (2009) evalu-
ated the impacts of supply disruption risks on the choice between the famous single and dual sourcing methods in a
two-stage supply chain with a non-stationary and price-sensitive demand. Friesz, Lee, and Lin (2011) presented a
dynamic supply chain network framework formulated as a differential variational inequality model, which allows consid-
eration of supply chain disruptions threat to producers, freight carriers and retail enterprises and resolved the differential
variational inequality by adopting a fixed point algorithm.
Issues of demand and cost disruption happening simultaneously were addressed in Lei, Li, and Liu (2012), where
risk management strategies in a supply chain were examined when the disruptions of demand and cost occurred. Xiao
and Qi (2008) presented a quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain with two Bertrand completing retail-
ers when production cost and market demand disruptions existed.
Wu et al. (2010) found that the linear quantity discount scheme can coordinate the supply chain with two competing
retailers, and the all-unit quantity discount scheme can coordinate the supply chain if the retailers are identical after the
market demand is disrupted. This study is mainly focused on the effects of demand disruption on the coordination
mechanism with quantity discount.
Although the revenue-sharing contract has been proven to be effective to coordinate the supply chain, in the existing
literature, the revenue-sharing contract has not been used in the study of supply chain coordination under demand and
cost disruptions. In this paper, we analyse the effects of simultaneous demand and cost disruptions on a supply chain
consisting of one manufacturer and n Bertrand competing retailers and investigate how to coordinate such a supply
chain with demand and cost simultaneous disruptions by a revenue-sharing contract.



































3. The basic model
We first consider the coordination mechanism of a supply chain in the baseline case (without disruption or under normal
circumstances). We begin with a manufacturer and n retailer model in which the price–demand relationship is determin-
istic and known. The manufacturer produces a product that is purchased by the retailers, who then sell it on the open
market. The situation can be viewed as a Stackelberg game, with the manufacturer assuming the role of the leader and
the retailers as the roles of the followers. In this context, the manufacturer plays first by offering the retailers a menu of
contracts ðwi;/iÞf g, in which the contract i is only a component contract, and each retailer i is free to choose a compo-
nent contract that is most preferred from the menu. The revenue-sharing contract i includes the wholesale price wi and a
share of revenue /i generated from each unit. The retailers act as followers then react to the menu of contracts by
choosing their most preferred contracts and choose the ordering quantities and retail price. At the same time, it is
assumed that the system information is perfect, that is, the individuals of a supply chain have the demand and cost
information. Let cs be the manufacturer’s unit production cost and cri is the retailer i unit production cost; thus,
ci ¼ cs þ cri is the total production cost of channel i and suppose that the ordering quantity of retailer i is described by
the following relationship




the linear demand function is commonly used in the literatures of supply chain management (Bernstein and Federgruen
2003; Cachon and Lariviere 2005; Xiao and Qi 2008). Where ai is the market scale (i.e. the maximum possible
demand), pi is the retail price (a decision variable). Similar to Xiao and Qi (2008), 0\d\ 1n1 is the substitutability
coefficient of products with different price. The substitutability coefficient 0\d\ 1n1 is a measure of the sensitivity of
the ith retailer’s sales to the change of the other retailers’ price. When the suffixes i and j simultaneously emerge in an





 pi; then, the revenue of retailer i
can be represented as RiðpÞ ¼ pi  ðai  pi þ dpiÞ. For simplicity, let RiiðpÞ ¼ @RiðpÞ@pi and RijðpÞ ¼
@RjðpÞ
@pi
. Similar to Cachon
and Lariviere (2005), we assume that the retailer i’s revenue is decreasing in qi, that is
@RiðqÞ
@qi
\0. Therefore, the retailer





[ 0. We further assume
that the retailer i’s revenue is also decreasing if retailer j has increased the sales qj, that is,
@RiðqÞ
@qj
\0, and the sales are
substitute among the different retailers, that is, @
2RiðqÞ
@qi@qj
\0. This means that the retailer i’s customers will transfer to other





[ 0. It is shown that the revenue of
retailer j is increasing (decreasing) with retailer i’s retail price (sales) increase.





RiðpÞ  ciqi½  ¼ Pi þ
Xn
j6¼i
















\0, therefore, the supply chain system total profit is a concave function about the retail price.
Denoting a system optimal vector of quantities and retail prices as q0 ¼ ðq01; q02; . . .; q0nÞ, p0 ¼ ðp01; p02; . . .; p0nÞ, respec-
tively, then p0 satisfies the following first-order conditions @PT ðpÞ@pi ¼ ai  pi þ d
Pn
j6¼i
pj  ðpi  ciÞ þ d
Pn
j6¼i
ðpj  cjÞ ¼ 0,
i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n, accordingly, we have 2pi ¼ ai þ d
Pn
j6¼i
ð2pj  cjÞ þ ci. The equilibrium retail prices of the n retailers can




ai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞci½ 
2 1 ðn 1Þd½ 
because of 0\d\ 1n1 ; P
0 [ 0
 
, the n retailers determine their retail prices simultaneously, and their retail prices are
the following unique Nash-Equilibrium point:





































2ð1þ dÞ  ai þ ð1þ dÞci  d
Xn
i¼1
ci þ d 
Pn
i¼1





>;; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n:




In a decentralised supply chain system, the manufacturer offers the retailers a revenue-sharing contract menu
ðwi;/iÞf g, and retailer i determines optimal retail price pi aiming to maximise its own profit given the contractual terms,
it is assumed that each retailer makes its decision independently. Consequently, retailer i’s profit would be
Pri ¼ /iRi  ðwi þ criÞqi, and the manufacturer’s profit from channel i is Psi ¼ ð1 /iÞRi þ ðwi  csÞqi.
The following theorem indicates that the manufacturer can use the revenue-sharing contract to induce the retail
prices to p0i and order quantity to q
0
i . As a consequence, the manufacturer’s own goal and maximum supply chain profit
can be achieved.
Proposition 1. The following revenue-sharing contracts coordinate a supply chain with Bertrand competing retailers,
if the contractual terms ðwi;/iÞ satisfy the equation w0i ¼ /0i ð2p0i  ai  d
Pn
j6¼i





































i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n. The optimal profits of the retailer and the manufacturer in channel i is













Pijðp0Þ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n; j 6¼ i (2)




RiðpÞ  ciqi½  ¼ Pi þ
Xn
j6¼i



























Pij ¼ai  pi þ d
Xn
j6¼i
pj  ðpi  ciÞ þ d
Xn
j6¼i
ðpj  cjÞ ¼ 0;
then we can get
pi
0 ¼ 1
2ð1þ dÞ  ai þ ð1þ dÞci  d
Xn
i¼1
ci þ d 
Pn
i¼1





>;; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n:




the profit of retailer i is














































the optimal retail prices that the retailers decided must meet the following first-order condition
@Pri
@pi





þ ðwi þ criÞ ¼ 0; if the revenue-sharing contract ðwi;/iÞ can coordinate the supply
chain, then the optimal retail prices that retailers decided must equal to that of a supply chain, pi ¼ p0i , therefore the fol-
lowing equation must hold:






Because 0\/0i\1 and it is illegal to sell below cost in practice (i.e. w
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Then the profits of the retailer and manufacture are as below
Y0
ri






ð1 /0i Þp0i þ w0i  cs
 
q0i
At the same time, if the supply chain does not adopt the revenue-sharing contract in decentralised decisions, the
profits of the partners can be listed as follows Y
ri

















 pi þ ðwi þ criÞ ¼ 0, we have
2pi ¼ ai þ d
Pn
j6¼i


















2þ d ai þ w
0
i þ cri þ d 
Pn
i¼1


























































































Clearly, the partners of the supply chain can obtain non-negative profit, and the revenue-sharing contract ðwi;/iÞ can
effectively coordinate the supply chain with n Bertrand competing retailers.
4. Centralised decisions with disruptions
In a centralised supply chain system, the manufacturer and the retailers are vertically integrated in a supply chain, they
seek to maximise the total system profit of a supply chain after the demand and costs disruptions have occurred. We
consider the situation with simultaneous demand and cost disruptions. Suppose that the demand market scale changes
from ai to ai þ Dai, and the manufacturer’s production cost changes from cs to cs þ Dc. The ordering quantity of retailer




Further, we assume ai þ Dai [ pi  d
Pn
j6¼i
pj, cs þ Dc[ 0. Let qi be the real demand of retailer i under the disruptions
and Dq ¼Pn
i¼1
ðqi  qi0Þ be the corresponding deviation of the manufacturer. When Dq ¼
Pn
i¼1
ðqi  qi0Þ[ 0, the produc-
tion must be increased in order to meet the new market demand. Usually, the unit production cost for the additional
products will be higher than the normal unit production cost because it has to get some extra production resources at a
higher price. When Dq ¼Pn
i¼1
ðqi  qi0Þ\0, there will be excess inventory that has to be sold in a secondary market at a
low price (Xu, Qi, and Yu 2006; Wu et al. 2010). In both cases, the demand and cost disruptions will cause adjustments
to the original production plan and ultimately affect the whole supply chain. We assume that the manufacturer bears
fully the production deviation cost caused by the disruptions (Yu and Qi 2004; Qi, Bard, and Yu 2004; Xu, Qi, and Yu
2006; Xiao and Qi 2008; Lei, Li, and Liu 2012). To reflect the influence of production variance at each channel on the
system total production deviation cost. It is further assumed that the manufacturer’s production deviation cost will be
determined by the weighted sum of each channel’s production deviation cost. The weight of each channel is calculated
as 1n. Note that the above assumptions are similar to those in the literatures (Qi, Bard, and Yu 2004; Xu, Qi, and Yu
2006; Wu et al. 2010). Therefore, the revenue and profit of location i after disruptions can be calculated as,
respectively:



























































































































pi  ci  Dcð Þ þ
Xn
j 6¼i































where ðxÞþ ¼ maxf0; xg, m1 [ 0, m2 [ 0 are the marginal extra costs of increased or decreased production from the
original plan, respectively. m1 [ 0 is the unit extra production cost compared with what has been planned when
Dq[ 0, and m2 [ 0 is the unit cost of handling the leftover inventory when the actual demand is inferior to the original
plan, Dq\0 (see (Xiao, Yu, and Sheng 2005; Xu, Qi, and Yu 2006)). If there is a centralised decision-maker who tries
to maximise the total supply chain system profit PT ðpÞ, the decision-maker will find the optimal retail price
p ¼ ðp1; p2; . . .; pnÞ that maximises Equation (3) and the corresponding optimal order quantity q ¼ ðq1; q2; . . .; qnÞ.
Intuitively, when the production cost increases or demand decreases, the optimal order quantity should decrease and vice












, the problem of maximising PT ðpÞ reduces to maximising the following
strictly concave function:





ðpi  ci  DcÞ þ
Xn
j6¼i































, the problem of maximising PT ðpÞ reduces to maximising the following
strictly concave function:





ðpi  ci  DcÞ þ
Xn
j6¼i


















The Kuhn–Tucker condition of Equation (4) is that at the optimal retail prices p ¼ ðp1; p2; . . .; pnÞ and ordering
quantity q ¼ ðq1; q2; . . .qnÞ, there exists a Lagrangian multiplier k 0 such that
@PT1ðpiÞ
@pi
 k ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n
ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j6¼i
pj 0i  0









To resolve the Kuhn–Tucker condition, we have two different cases with respect to the Lagrangian multiplier k ¼ 0
or k[ 0.
Case 1: when k ¼ 0, then Equation (6) equivalent to @PT1ðpiÞ@pi ¼ 0 and ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j 6¼i
pj  q0i [ 0 hold simulta-
neously. Consequently, 2ð1þ dÞpi ¼ ai þ Dai þ d
Pn
i¼1
ð2pi  ci  DcÞ þ ð1þ dÞðci þ DcÞ þ m1, (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n) and
ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j 6¼i
pj  q0i [ 0 hold simultaneously. We obtain the total retail prices of retailers by accumulated adding






































ai þ Dai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞðci þ DcÞ½  þ nm1
2½1 ðn 1Þd , thus we obtain the equilibrium retail prices of the n




 ai þ Dai  d
Xn
i¼1
ðci þ DciÞ þ ð1þ dÞðci þ DcÞ þ m1 þ 2d 
Pn
i¼1






¼ pi0 þ 12ð1þ dÞ  Dai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞDcþ m1 þ d 
Pn
i¼1






and the constraint condition ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j 6¼i





n½1ðn1Þd\ m11ðn1Þd. Obviously, the optimal ordering quantity of retailer i satisfies qi [ q0i .
Case 2: If k[ 0, then the Kuhn–Tucker condition of Equation (6) equivalent to @PT1ðpiÞ@pi ¼ k and
ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j 6¼i
pj  q0i ¼ 0 hold simultaneously. Thus, 2ð1þ dÞpi ¼ ai þ Dai þ d
Pn
i¼1
ð2pi  ci  DcÞþ
ð1þ dÞðci þ DcÞ þ m1  k and ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j 6¼i
pj  q0i ¼ 0 hold simultaneously. The total retail prices of retailers





Thus, the optimal retail price for retailer i is








75þ pi0, and the optimal ordering quantity of retailer i is qi ¼ q0i . The constraint
condition k[ 0 is equivalent to k ¼ ai þ Dai þ d
Pn
i¼1
ð2pi  ci  DcÞ þ ð1þ dÞðci þ DcÞ þ m1  2ð1þ dÞpi [ 0. Adding












2½1ðn1Þd into it, the con-









n½1ðn1Þd [  m11ðn1Þd.
The Kuhn–Tucker condition of Equation (5) is that at the optimal retail prices p ¼ ðp1; p2; . . .; pnÞ, there exists a
Lagrangian multiplier u 0 such that the following equations hold
@PT2ðpiÞ
@pi
þ u ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n


















































Through resolving the Kuhn–Tucker condition, we have two different cases with respect to the Lagrangian multiplier u.
Case 3: when u ¼ 0, Equation (7) equivalent to 2ð1þ dÞpi ¼ ai þ Dai þ d
Pn
i¼1
ð2pi  ci  DcÞ þ ð1þ dÞ









½ai þ Dai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞðci þ DcÞ  nm2




 ai þ Dai  d
Xn
i¼1
ðci þ DciÞ þ ð1þ dÞðci þ DcÞ  m2 þ 2d 
Pn
i¼1






¼ pi0 þ 12ð1þ dÞ  Dai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞDc m2 þ d 
Pn
i¼1






The constraint condition ai þ Dai  pi þ d
Pn
j6¼i





n½1 ðn 1Þd [
m2





Case 4: when u[ 0, the Kuhn–Tucker condition of Equation (7) equivalent to
2ð1þ dÞpi ¼ ai þ Dai þ d
Pn
i¼1










1ðn1Þd þ P0, and the retail prices of retailer i is








75þ pi0, and the optimal ordering quantity of retailer i is qi ¼ q0i .












Summarising the above results, we have the following proposition:




production cost disruption Dc and market demand scale disruption Dai, the total supply chain profit is maximised at the
optimal retail prices pi.
pi ¼


























where K1 ¼ d 
Pn
i¼1
½Dai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞDc þ nm1
1 ðn 1Þd and K2 ¼ d 
Pn
i¼1
½Dai þ ð1 ðn 1ÞdÞDc  nm2
1 ðn 1Þd ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n



































Proposition 2 indicates how to correctly respond to demand and cost disruptions. The expression (8) in Proposition
2 implies that the optimal retail price pi can be obtained by adding an adjustment to the original retail price p0i . It can
also be found that the optimal retail price pi given in (8) always increase linearly with Dai. In particular, when the mar-
ket scale is increased (Dai [ 0), the retailers will increase the price (in Case 1 and Case 2); when the market scale is
decreased (Dai\0), the retail price will be reduced (in Case 3 and Case 4). However, when the market scale has only




n½1ðn1Þd\Dcþ m11ðn1Þd, keeping the original product
quantity q0i is recommended, this shows that the original quantity strategy was resilient enough under limited market
turbulence; however, when the market scale changes are large enough (in Case 1 and Case 3), adjusting the product
quantities and retail prices becomes necessary.
5. Coordination of supply chain after disruptions
In a decentralised supply chain, all members will adjust their respective strategies and make decisions independently to
maximise their individual profits after the demand and cost disruptions take place. The manufacturer will adjust the menu of
revenue-sharing contracts including wholesale price wi and the retailers’ shares of revenue /i generated from each unit, and
the retailers will again select their favourite contract. Therefore, the previously derived coordination scheme (menu of con-
tract) must be modified to achieve the maximum supply chain profit. Recall that the optimal retail prices p ¼ ðp1; p2; . . .; pnÞ
is given in Proposition 2 for this case. In the baseline case, the manufacturer can use a revenue-sharing contract to induce the
retailer to adopt retail prices p0 ¼ ðp01; p02; . . .; p0nÞ. When the market demand and production cost are disrupted, and decision-
making is decentralised, a similar revenue-sharing contract can also be used to coordinate a supply chain.
When a decentralised supply chain adopts a revenue-sharing contract under demand and production cost disruption,
the retailer’s profit is:
















þ ðwi þ criÞ ¼ 0. We
find the equilibrium retail prices are pDi ¼







Now the manufacturer needs to see whether it is possible to choose appropriate parameters in the revenue-sharing
contract so that the whole supply chain can be coordinated. Similar to Proposition 2, we differentiate the coordination
problem into three cases based on the degree of disruptions. We know that the decentralised supply chain is coordinated
when prices are equivalent to the optimal prices of the centralised channel. By solving pDi ¼ pi , we derive the following
– Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. For the decentralised case with both production cost and demand disruptions, the retailers select a
most preferred contract from the menu of contracts ðwi ;/i Þ offered by the manufacturer, the revenue-sharing contract
can coordinate the supply chain and the profit allocation of the optimal supply chain profit can be realised if ðwi ;/i Þ
satisfies the following condition:
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Proof: We know that if the decentralised supply chain system is coordinated by the revenue-sharing contract, the
equilibrium retail prices in the decentralised supply chain are equivalent to the optimal retail price in the centralised
supply chain, that is to say, pDi ¼ pi . Solving the equations with respect to wi and /i , we have






Because 0\/i \1 and w

i [ cs þ Dc, we have
cri þ cs þ Dc





Then we have the profits of the partners with a new revenue-sharing contact under disruptions:
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the following conditions should be satisfied:
/i [
ð/0i p0i  w0i  criÞq0ir
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Furthermore, the following results hold: if Dai ¼ 0 and Dc ¼ 0, then m1 ¼ m2 ¼ 0, and the whole supply chain
system profit is simplified PT ðqÞ = PT ðqÞ ¼
Pn
i¼1
½RiðqÞ  ciqi, so the optimal retailer’s price and wholesale price equal,





 cri ¼ w0i . Consequently, the revenue-sharing contract
ðwi ;/i Þ can also realise supply chain coordination. In short, the improved revenue-sharing contract has anti-disruptions
ability; the above results are consistent with that of the work by Cachon and Lariviere (2005).



































From Propositions 2 and 3, we find that when the cost and demand disruptions happen simultaneously and the








CA, the production quantity
need not be changed, while the retail prices and the revenue-sharing fraction for the retailers should be changed; if the
degree of disruption exceeds certain ranges, both the production quantity, retail prices and the revenue-sharing fractions
should be changed for the coordination necessary for the supply chain.
6. Numerical examples
In this section, we present some examples to analyse the effects of the demand and cost disruptions on the coordination
mechanism. In particular, we are interested in the effect of the disruption management after various demand and cost
changes. Knowing the demand and cost changes, the manufacturer will adopt an appropriate new revenue-sharing
contract to recoordinate the supply chain (we called it the new policy). Conversely, if the manufacturer is unaware of
the demand and cost changes and cannot react to the demand and cost disruptions in a timely manner, the retailers will
keep the pre-assumed retail prices without changes and have the freedom to make new orders according to the real mar-
ket (we called it the original policy). For these two cases, we compare the relative parameters of revenue-sharing con-
tracts and analyse the profit difference from the perspective of partners and the whole supply chain. Without loss of
generality, we consider a supply chain system consists of a manufacturer and three retailers, the demand–price function
is qi ¼ ai  pi þ d
P
j6¼i
pj, (i ¼ 1 3).
We first consider the revenue-sharing contract without disruptions and analyse the following examples with parame-
ters: a1 ¼ a2 ¼ a3 ¼ 20, cr1 ¼ 1, cr2 ¼ 2, cr3 ¼ 3, cs ¼ 6, d ¼ 0:4. In the baseline case, given the above values, from
Proposition 1, we can obtain the retail prices of retailer 1, retailer 2, and retailer 3, respectively, p01 ¼ 53:5, p02 ¼ 54,
and p03 ¼ 54:5. The corresponding ordering quantities are q01 ¼ 9:9, q02 ¼ 9:2, and q03 ¼ 8:5. The optimal production
quantity of manufacturer is 27:6, the profits for channel 1, channel 2, and channel 3 are P1 ¼ 460:35, P2 ¼ 423:2, and
P3 ¼ 386:75, respectively, the total profit of supply chain is 1270.3. Based on Proposition 1, we can obtain the reve-
nue-sharing contract for assuring the coordination of the supply chain, and the revenue-sharing contract parameters
satisfy the following conditions.
w1 ¼ 43:6  /1  1, /1 2 ð0:1606; 0:5596Þ; w2 ¼ 44:8  /2  2, /2 2 ð0:1786; 0:5556Þ; w3 ¼ 46  /2  3,
/3 2 ð0:1987; 0:5515Þ. We can illustrate the revenue-sharing contracts, which are depicted in Figures 1–3. From Figures
1–3, we find that only the value of wi and /i along the continuous line can make the supply coordinated.
If, further assuming that the manufacturer and retailers agree to share the total supply chain profit at a ratio of 6:4
under the assumption of symmetric information, where /1 ¼ /2 ¼ /3 ¼ 0:4, then from Proposition 1, we can obtain
the wholesale w1 ¼ 16:44, w2 ¼ 15:92, w3 ¼ 15:4. From Equation (1) in Proposition 1, we can obtain the retailers’

















Figure 1. The revenue-sharing contract: the wholesale price w1 vs. revenue share /1.




















































Figure 2. The revenue-sharing contract: the wholesale price w2 vs. revenue share /2.

















Figure 3. The revenue-sharing contract: the wholesale price w3 vs. revenue share /3.
Table 1. The optimal retail price and quantity under different disruptions.
Cases 1 2 3 4
Da1 −1 −1 1 1
Da2 −1 −1 1 1
Da3 −1 −1 1 1
Dc −1.5 1.5 −1.5 1.5
Production quantity Original policy 24.6 24.6 30.6 30.6
New policy 27.6 27.15 28.05 27.6
Retailer 1 (quantity, price) Original policy 8.9, 53.5 8.9, 53.5 10.9, 53.5 10.9, 53.5
New policy 9.9, 48.5 9.75, 49.25 10.05, 57.75 9.9, 58.5
Retailer 2 (quantity, price) Original policy 8.2, 54 8.2, 54 10.2, 54 10.2, 54
New policy 9.2, 49.0 9.05, 49.75 9.35, 58.25 9.2, 59
Retailer 3 (quantity, price) Original policy 7.5, 54.5 7.5, 54.5 9.5, 54.5 9.5, 54.5
New policy 8.5, 49.5 8.35, 50.25 8.65, 58.75 8.5, 59.5



































optimal profits Pr1 ¼ 39.2040, Pr2 ¼ 33.8560 and Pr3 ¼ 28.9000, respectively. The optimal profits of the manufacturer
and the supply chain are Ps ¼ 1168:3 and PT ¼ 1270:3, respectively. As a result, it is clear that the revenue-sharing
contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain.
Furthermore, we consider and analyse the following example with parameters: a1 ¼ a2 ¼ a3 ¼ 20, cr1 ¼ 1, cr2 ¼ 2,
cr3 ¼ 3, d ¼ 0:4 Da1 ¼ f1; 1g, Da2 ¼ f1; 1g, Da3 ¼ f1; 1g, Dc ¼ f1:5; 1:5g, m1 ¼ m2 ¼ 1. In general, the
directions of the market demand or cost disruptions faced by retailers are very much in the same direction. So, we consider
the cases that retailers are facing similar disruptions in market demands or production costs, the similar cases were
discussed in (Xiao and Qi 2008). We obtained the retail prices and wholesale prices under the original policy and the new
policy, which are reported, respectively, in Tables 1 and 2. In order to illustrate the efficiency of the revenue-sharing con-
tracts, the associated parameters, including location profits are depicted in Table 3. The different disruptions have effects
on partners and total profits, which are given in Table 4.
Table 2. The optimal wholesale price under different disruptions.
Cases 1 2 3 4
Da1 −1 −1 1 1
Da2 −1 −1 1 1
Da3 −1 −1 1 1
Dc −1.5 1.5 −1.5 1.5
w1 Original policy 16.84 16.84 16.04 16.04
New policy 14.44 14.8 18.08 18.44
w2 Original policy 16.32 16.32 15.52 15.52
New policy 13.92 14.28 17.56 17.92
w3 Original policy 15.8 15.8 15 15
New policy 13.4 13.76 17.04 17.4
Table 3. The optimal location profit under different disruptions.
Cases 1 2 3 4
Da1 −1 −1 1 1
Da2 −1 −1 1 1
Da3 −1 −1 1 1
Dc −1.5 1.5 −1.5 1.5
Channel 1’s profit Original policy 426.2 399.5 522.2 489.5
New policy 425.7 397.1625 524.9625 495
Channel 2’s profit Original policy 388.5 363.9 483.5 452.9
New policy 391 364.1125 483.7125 455.4
Channel 3’s profit Original policy 351.5 329 445.5 417
New policy 357 331.7625 443.1625 416.5
Table 4. The effects of different disruptions on partners and total profits.
Cases Da1 Da2 Da3 Dc
























1 –1 –1 –1 –1.5 1085.1 1071.7 31.684 39.2040 26.896 33.856 22.5 28.9 1166.2 1173.7
2 –1 –1 –1 1.5 1011.3 994.4 31.684 38.025 26.896 32.761 22.5 27.889 1092.4 1093
3 1 1 1 –1.5 1326 1346.5 47.524 40.4010 41.616 34.969 36.1 29.929 1451.2 1451.8
4 1 1 1 1.5 1234.2 1264.9 47.524 39.2 41.616 33.856 36.1 28.9 1359.4 1366.9



































In general, when there is only production cost disruption, the optimal production quantities and production cost
disruptions are negatively correlated, that is the higher the production cost is, the smaller the optimal production
quantity will be, as the optimal retail price increases, and vice versa (Xu, Qi, and Yu 2006). When there is only demand
disruption, the optimal production quantities and demand disruptions are positively correlated, that is the larger the
demand is, the higher the optimal production quantity will be, as the optimal retail price increases, vice versa (Qi, Bard,
and Yu 2004). However, from Proposition 2 in Equation (8), we know that the optimal retail price is an increasing
function of the incremental amount of demand when the production cost and demand simultaneously disrupted.
From Table 1, we found that the retail prices are unchanged when one adopts the original policy. The optimal
production quantities (or the ordering quantities) and demand disruptions are positively correlated, and the optimal pro-
duction quantities are independent of the cost disruptions. However, in a new policy, the changes of the retail price and
ordering quantity are more complicated. When the market size is changed slightly (the first case and the fourth case in
Table 1), keeping the original production plan but adjusting the retail prices should be sufficient to deal with the disrup-
tions of demand and cost of productions, which demonstrates that the original plan has certain degree of robustness.
When the market size is changed significantly (the second case and the third case in Table 1), it requires the production
plan (in terms of the quantity of products) as well as the retail price to be adjusted in order to settle disruptions of
demand and cost of productions. The main reasons are as follows: when the demand and production costs change in the
same direction and within a robust region (the first case and the fourth case in Table 1), the demand and the cost disrup-
tion will interact with each other; thus, there is a mutual constraint relationship between demand interruption and cost
production. The manufacturer does not need to adjust the production plan (qi ¼ q0i ), and all the retailers’ optimal order-
ing quantities are equal to their optimal ordering quantities under normal circumstances, that is q1 ¼ q01 ¼ 9:9,
q2 ¼ q02 ¼ 9:2, q3 ¼ q03 ¼ 8:5, and the optimal production quantity of manufacturer is 27.6, which shows that the supply
chain achieves optimal profits. However, all the retailers need to adjust their retail prices to deal with the demand and
cost disruptions. Additionally, the demand and production cost disruptions mutually affect and restrict each other, that is
the adverse effect of one disrupted event is eliminated by another disrupted event, and therefore, the total supply chain
profit remains stable, demonstrating that the revenue-sharing contract’s robustness. The supply chain obtains a higher
profit by changing the retail prices in these cases.
From Tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that when the market demand and production cost are disrupted in different
directions, from the second case, the market demand decreases and production cost increases simultaneously, the sup-
plier responds to the disruption in both the original strategy and the new strategy by decreasing the production quantity
from the original optimal production quantity: 27.6 to 24.6 and 27.15, respectively. From the third case, the market
demand increases and production cost decreases simultaneously, the supplier responds to the disruption by increasing
the production quantity compared with the original optimal production quantity: 27.6. The optimal production quantity,
retail prices, and coordination strategy should be adjusted in response to the disruptions in these two above cases. From
Table 4, we can see that the retail prices bring in higher total profit in the new strategy than that in the old strategy,
which adopts fixed retail prices.
From Table 2, we found the wholesale price is independent of the cost disruptions when one adopts the original policy.
The reasons are the retail prices are unchanged (from Table 1, we known that p01 ¼ 53:5, p02 ¼ 54 and p03 ¼ 54:5) and the
production quantities (ordering quantities) are independent of the cost disruptions. Moreover, from Table 4, we found the
retailer’s profit is independent of the cost disruptions when one adopts the original policy because the retail prices and
wholesale prices do not change and the manufacturer bears fully the production deviation cost caused by the disruptions.
From Table 4, we find that the effect of disruption management on the partners’ profitability can be significant, even
when the effect on the channel profit is fairly small. According to Tables 3 and 4, the total supply chain system’s profits
of the new production plan are more than those of keeping the original retail prices. Tables 3 and 4 also indicate that
the improved revenue-sharing contract can cope with demand and cost disruptions.
7. Conclusion
In this study, a mathematic model-based Stacklberg game theory has been proposed for analysing the process of coordi-
nating of a supply chain under disruptions of market demands and production costs as well as for providing optimised
decisions-making. We introduced optimised strategies for the coordination of revenue-sharing contracts between a manu-
facturer and the retailers of a supply chain under demand and cost simultaneous disruptions.
In a centralised system, we proposed an optimised strategy model; optimised solutions for price and quantity are
obtained through resolving Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) condition. When the market size is changed slightly, keeping
the original production plan but adjusting the retail prices should be sufficient to deal with the disruptions of demand
and cost of productions, which demonstrates that the original plan has certain degree of robustness. When the market



































size is changed significantly, it requires the production plan (in terms of the quantity of products) as well as the retail
price to be adjusted in order to settle disruptions of demand and cost of productions.
In a decentralised system, a modified revenue-sharing contract is needed when demand and cost interruptions occur,
when no disruption exists the basic model will be applied (Proposition 1). To resolve the problem of coordinating a sup-
ply chain after disruptions on demands and costs from marketing is a complex and dynamic challenge, one way to sup-
port decision-making is to develop a mechanism that works in an interactive manner, thus more realistic solutions based
on the scenarios can be provided, this is the direction we are currently working on.
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